Abstract. We take a closer look at the Open Protocol for Access Control, Identification, and Ticketing with privacY (OPACITY). This Diffie-Hellman-based protocol is supposed to provide a secure and privacy-friendly key establishment for contactless environments. It is promoted by the US Department of Defense and meanwhile available in several standards such as ISO/IEC 24727-6 and ANSI 504-1. To the best of our knowledge, so far no detailed cryptographic analysis has been publicly available. Thus, we investigate in how far the common security properties for authenticated key exchange and impersonation resistance, as well as privacy-related properties like untraceability and deniability, are met.
Introduction
OPACITY is short for the Open Protocol for Access Control, Identification, and Ticketing with privacY. It is basically a Diffie-Hellman-based protocol to establish secure channels in contactless environments. According to Eric Le Saint of the company ActivIdentity, co-inventor in the patent application [47] , the development has been sponsored by the US Department of Defense [48] . The inventors have declared the contributions to OPACITY to be a statutory invention with the United States Patent and Trademark Office, essentially allowing royaltyfree and public usage of the contribution. The protocol has been registered as an ISO/IEC 24727-6 authentication protocol [27] and is specified in the draft ANSI 504-1 national standard (GICS) [24] . Informal yet outdated descriptions are available through the homepage of the Smart Card Alliance [3].
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Security Assessment of OPACITY
As Eric Le Saint emphasizes in his description of OPACITY [48] , "This protocol was designed expressly to remove the usage restrictions on contactless transactions while still delivering high performance security and privacy." Surprisingly, we are not aware of any profound and public cryptographic analysis of the protocol, including clear claims about security and privacy goals. The best effort, in terms of the Smart Card Alliance, seems to be compliance with standards [3]:
"The protocol strictly follows U.S. government and international standards. It has been assessed for compliance with the NIST standard for key establishment protocols (SP 800-56A). As a consequence, further protocol design reviews are unnecessary prior to FIPS 140-2 security certification."
It is of course not the case -and we do not think that the Smart Card Alliance statement suggests so-that compliance with SP 800-56A, or certification according to FIPS 140-2, instantaneously gives strong cryptographic security guarantees. The NIST document SP 800-56A [41] only provides useful but, nonetheless, high-level recommendations for key-establishment schemes based on the discrete logarithm problem, and specifies some schemes from ANSI X9. To the best of our knowledge, it has not been shown formally yet under which conditions protocols complying with SP 800-56A are also cryptographically secure (in whatever sense). This is particularly true as OPACITY supports renegotiation techniques and also states privacy enhancement as an additional goal. Neither property is discussed in SP 800-56A.
Similarly, even if OPACITY was FIPS 140-2 certified and thus checked by an accredited authority, this does not necessarily imply strong security guarantees either. An obvious testimony to this argument are the easy attacks on FIPS 140-2 level 2 certified USB memory tokens where access was always granted for a fixed string, independently of the password [17, 18] . Certification according to FIPS 140-2, and this is acknowledged in the standard, only intends "to maintain the security provided by a cryptographic module" in the utilized environment; the "operator of a cryptographic module is responsible for ensuring that the security provided by the module is sufficient." (see [39] ).
Hence, we believe that OPACITY deserves a closer cryptographic look. Clearly, there are many practical protocols which lack such an analysis, or have at least not been scrutinized publicly. What makes OPACITY a worthwhile object for a cryptographic analysis is:
-OPACITY is standardized and may thus be deployed extensively in the near future. This is all the more true as it is a general purpose protocol, suitable, for instance, for use in access control for buildings, but also for ticketing in transport systems [48] . -OPACITY does not seem to be deployed broadly yet. It is our firm belief that protocols should be rigorously analyzed before they are actually utilized, in order to prevent damage caused by weaknesses discovered after deployment. Furthermore, patching a popular protocol in use is often intricate and progresses slowly (see the example of MD5-based certificates [51] ).
